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ABSTRACT: Like most philosophers, Heidegger gave little attention to childhood, but his 
philosophical emphasis on pre-reflective practice and understanding seems uniquely quali-
fied to help make sense of a child’s experience and development. Moreover, it seems to me 
that many central Heideggerian concepts are best defended, exemplified, and articulated by 
bringing child development into the discussion. A Heideggerain emphasis on pre-theoretical 
world-involvement opens up a rich array of phenomena for studying child development, 
which can improve upon standard theories that have over-emphasized exclusive conditions 
or criteria. I begin by laying out some basic features of Heidegger’s conception of being-
in-the-world as a preparation for understanding the world of the child. Then I will briefly 
discuss some of Heidegger’s remarks on childhood, followed by some reflections on language 
acquisition and the correlation of anxiety and meaning.
WE ARE ALL BIG BABIES —thrown by our birth and beginnings and thrown out with the bath water by philosophy. Childhood and child-rearing 
have not been given sufficient consideration in philosophy, most likely because 
philosophy engages in complex conceptual reflections and articulations that are 
not indicated in a child’s abilities and experiences. Childhood has either been 
ignored or retrospectively described as a primitive precursor to, or deficiency of, 
mature rational competence. Descartes, for example, took childhood to be ruled 
by the body’s appetites and sense perceptions. Accordingly, childhood helps 
explain the difficulty of arriving at mature spheres of rational knowledge. Even 
adult beliefs are not as “solid as they should have been had we had complete use 
of our reason since our birth, and had we been guided by its means alone.”1 The 
predominance of reflective paradigms has produced much distortion of the child’s 
world and its relation to adult experience. Even when we grant the importance 
of advanced rational capacities, the fact that such capacities have a history in an 
individual’s life, that they emerged out of, and often in tension with, other quite 
different modes of being, suggests that child development should be of pressing 
interest to philosophy.
I am convinced that most philosophical questions would be well served by a 
consideration of child development, as a necessary condition for understanding how 
human realities are historical phenomena in a special sense: namely, the intersection 
1The Philosophical Works of Descartes I, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 88. For a collection that gathers traditional and more current selections 
by philosophers on childhood, see The Philosopher’s Child: Critical Essays in the Western Tradition, ed. 
Susan M. Turner and Gareth B. Matthews (Rochester NY: Rochester University Press, 1998).
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of personal and cultural history in the milieu of child rearing—since the raising of 
children is always informed by the historical influences upon, and cultural expecta-
tions of, care-givers and teachers at every level of engagement. One way to address 
this matter is to sense the radical implications of Aristotle’s claim that knowledge is 
marked by the capacity to teach, rather than mere experience (Metaphysics 981b8 ff.). 
What I find interesting in this remark is that the longstanding philosophical stipula-
tion that knowledge must somehow exceed immediate experience is here expressed 
not in terms of some transcendent source or “pure” faculty of cognition, but rather 
the practical setting of pedagogical repetition, which simultaneously preserves 
and creates cultural phenomena by “leading” someone (educere) toward acquir-
ing insights and skills that have shaped the experience of predecessors. Education 
exhibits the temporal/historical structure of being, and it is the lifeblood of culture, 
which survives the passage of time through the rearing and shaping of children. 
We should note that the Greek word for education, paideia, which also denotes the 
idea of culture and learned accomplishments generally, is derived from pais, the 
word for child; so in paideia, the Greeks named an intrinsic relationship between 
children, education, and culture.
Like most other philosophers, Heidegger gave little attention to childhood, but his 
philosophical emphasis on pre-reflective practice and understanding seems uniquely 
qualified to help make sense of a child’s experience and development. Moreover, it 
seems to me that many central Heideggerian concepts are best defended, exemplified, 
and articulated by bringing child development into the discussion: Consider how 
potentiality, temporality, and the historical repetition of tradition can be seen to mark 
child-rearing as the beginning of Dasein’s situated emergence; consider also how 
the hermeneutic circle and especially Dasein’s thrownness are perfectly intelligible 
in terms of having been reared. A Heideggerain emphasis on pre-reflective world-
involvement opens up a richer array of phenomena for studying child development, 
which can improve upon standard theories that have over-emphasized exclusive 
conditions or criteria: for instance, cognitive development (Piaget), psycho-sexual 
development and abnormal behavior (Freud), external conditioning (Skinner), and 
biogenetic forces (sociobiology).2 I want to begin by laying out some basic features 
of Heidegger’s conception of being-in-the-world as a preparation for understanding 
the world of the child. Then I will briefly discuss some of Heidegger’s remarks on 
childhood, followed by some reflections on language and the correlation of anxiety 
and meaning.3
Dasein is being-in-the-world, which means it is never separable from world 
involvement, and it cannot be understood as a discrete subject on one side of a 
2For an excellent critical survey of standard theories, see R. Murray Thomas, Comparing Theories of 
Child Development, 5th edition (Belmont CA: Wadsworth, 2000). For a study of child and human develop-
ment that accords well with Heidegger’s thought, see Bernard J. Boelen, Personal Maturity: The Existential 
Dimension (New York: Seabury, 1978), especially chaps. 2–3. See also Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Child’s 
Relations With Others,” in The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays, ed. James E. Edie (Evanston IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. 96–155.
3Portions of what follows are drawn from my book, Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to 
Moral Philosophy (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).
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self-world relation. Da-sein is the “there” of being, the disclosive opening of and to 
being. For Heidegger, Dasein’s existence is ek-static, in the sense of standing-out, 
which is to say, not the “inside” of a discrete consciousness, not even an outside 
as the “other side” of consciousness, but a standing in the out, an immersion in the 
“there” of being that characterizes Dasein’s prereflective involvement in the world.4 
Before the detached, reflective standpoint of theoretical reason and scientific objec-
tivity, we are “always already” shaped by everyday concerns, practical involvement, 
moods and affects, inherited customs and traditions, social relations, and language 
uses. These spheres cannot be bracketed or displaced in any philosophical inquiry 
that aims for a comprehensive understanding of the meaning of being. Contrary to 
the idea of knowledge as the discovery of free-standing facts or truths independent 
of human involvement—some uninterpreted “given” out of which inferences can 
proceed from unadulterated, stable foundations—Heidegger insists that all forms 
of thought are saturated with prior modes of understanding that Dasein brings to 
any inquiry. Consequently, philosophical thought must be hermeneutical, it must 
work on and with already operating forces and capacities, rather than see itself as 
the search for some purely objective ground. Hermeneutics discounts the possibil-
ity of a “view from nowhere.” No inquiry begins from scratch; it is always shaped 
by prior modes of understanding or direction that usually go unnoticed because of 
their tacit character.
Childhood can be seen as the ontogenetic “origin” of Dasein’s tacit understanding 
of being. As a result of child-rearing, each mature Dasein brings to any endeavor 
the effects and influences of its enculturation since the first moments of life. And 
this is a crucial sense in which Dasein is Mitsein, or socially shaped all the way 
down. Child-rearing opens up issues that undermine the modern, individualistic 
conception of the self and that lend credence to Heideggerian phenomenology. The 
prevailing view has taken social relations as a second-order sphere compared to the 
original immediacy of self-consciousness. And epistemologically, the emphasis has 
been on monological reason, where knowledge is understood from the standpoint 
of the individual mind, its faculties, and rational procedures. Heidegger follows 
Hegel in arguing for a social self. Dasein is “essentially Mitsein (being-with).”5 
For instance, the practices of Dasein’s world are primarily social practices, as 
a relatedness to others and their practices (my writing for readers with pen and 
paper made by others, and so on). Social relations are not inside-out connections 
between mutually secluded selves. Others are part of the disclosive “there” of 
Dasein’s being. Being-with is part of Dasein’s being-in, part of Dasein’s inhabitive 
dwelling (BT, p. 155). In everyday dealings, I do not “launch” myself into social 
relations from the standpoint of a discrete, interior consciousness. I am with oth-
ers in innumerable co-concerns and social transactions that continually occupy 
my life. This is not to deny individuality, or distinctions between self and others, 
4See Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), pp. 283–84. In my text I will employ the spelling “ekstatic” in order to distinguish Heidegger’s 
specific meaning from other possible connotations.
5Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 
1962), p. 156, hereafter BT.
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or the inwardness of self-conscious reflection, but only to assert an interactive 
social milieu that is more original than the individualized model of the conscious 
self. Primal sociality is most obviously evident in child-rearing, considering the 
essential dependence of the child on others for its enculturation into a world of 
practices and language use.6
For Heidegger, being is not an object and the world cannot be understood as 
simply a collection of objects. The being of the world is a context of meaning orga-
nized around the phenomenon of care. His analysis begins with a consideration of 
practical dealings with things in terms of use and production (BT, p. 96), something 
opened up by the phenomenon of tool use, which is characterized as zuhanden, 
meaning in use and at use, as opposed to something vorhanden, or merely present 
before an attentive gaze. Zuhandenheit refers to practical familiarity, competence, 
and involvement, which is generally designated as circumspection (Umsicht), 
which names the field of purposive practices and tacit competencies animated by 
existential concerns.
As is typical of Heidegger’s approach, the meaning of this field of circumspective 
concern is disclosed by way of a negation, that is, in a breakdown of the practice-
field occasioned by a disruption or malfunction. As Heidegger puts it: “everything 
positive becomes particularly clear when seen from the side of the privative.”7 
When a breakdown interrupts my practice, I now become more explicitly aware of 
the purposive background by force of the interruption. The breakdown also turns 
my attention to relevant properties and aspects of the tool that in use are not in my 
attention (thus Heidegger’s contention that objective, vorhanden disclosure is a 
second-order account, derived from disturbances to zuhanden practices). Objective 
descriptions and talk of mental beliefs are not false, but such second-order descrip-
tions cannot do justice to a phenomenology of nonreflective competencies. It is 
true that learning new practices and skills comes with a sense of reflective distance 
from practice and analytical divisions between mental beliefs and conditions in 
the world separate from beliefs. But such learning milieus always bank on other 
background competencies and tacit familiarities that make the learning possible. In 
addition, when the new skill has been mastered, the learned practice then becomes 
an unreflective, skillful, familiar competency; that is to say, it becomes the “second 
nature” of habit. This entire complex of learning new habits by way of prior habits 
is prepared by child-rearing, the original milieu of habituation.
Heidegger’s organizational term for the “whole” of Dasein’s being-in-the-world 
is care (BT, p. 227). Care gathers in one term a complex of existential meanings: 
(1) caring about, a concernful mattering,8 (2) taking care and caring for (BT, pp. 
157, 243), and (3) a negative sense of worries and burdens (as in the cares of the 
world). This last sense leads to Heidegger’s emphasis on anxiety (Angst). Mood 
6See Katherine Nelson, Young Minds in Social Worlds: Experience, Meaning, and Memory (Cambridge 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
7Heidegger, Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1982), p. 309, hereafter BP.
8Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 294, hereafter HCT.
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(Befindlichkeit) is essential to Dasein’s understanding of its world. Anxiety, for 
Heidegger, is a basic mood that opens up the general meaning of care, particularly 
in terms of being-toward-death. Anxiety is an experience in which meaning re-
cedes and Dasein encounters a kind of “nothing.” In anxiety, Dasein is unheimlich, 
no longer at home (BT, p. 233). The nothing experienced in anxiety is not the 
negation of the world per se, but the negation of its meaning, and thus its being 
in Heidegger’s sense of the term. But Heidegger insists that this encounter with 
meaninglessness is not the opposite of being or meaning, but rather the correlate 
of being and meaning, as the existential contrast that discloses meaning in the first 
place. We care about the world and our place in it because we are radically finite. 
Anxiety wrenches us out of familiar world-involvement and discloses the heretofore 
concealed meaning of that involvement, in a manner analogous to the disruption 
of zuhanden conditions. The meaning of being, for Heidegger, is always charged 
by an absence; and the primal interruption of anxiety charges us with engaging 
the radically finite meaning of being.
What does all this have to do with childhood? Heidegger does offer some occa-
sional remarks about childhood that are of interest. He says that the child’s world 
too is laden and charged with Dasein’s meaning structures (BP, p. 171). He also 
grants that being-toward-death is a one-sided phenomenon, that a full articulation 
of temporality must include birth, that care is a stretching between birth and death 
(BT, pp. 425ff.). It would do well, I think, to explore further this temporal stretch-
ing with respect to child development. Heidegger says very little in this regard, 
except for some tantalizing passages in the 1928 /29 lecture course Einleitung in die 
Philosophie.9 The child is no less a human Dasein than an adult is (GA 27, p.123), 
but the child exists in a kind of “twilight” condition and as a “helpless deliverance 
in the world” (pp. 125–26). Our birth and early experiences are not just a temporal 
beginning, they are the early manifestation of being-in-the-world that “does not 
simply lie behind us,” that is still close to us in some way (p.124).10 The twilight 
character of the child is described as rest, warmth, nourishment, sleep, and a kind 
of nontelic directedness of movements toward and away from elements in the envi-
ronment (p. 125). The child comes into the world crying, and negative experiences 
of shock and fright continue to shape the child’s comportment (p. 125). Heidegger 
here is able to draw on his phenomenology to show that such comportment belies 
the notion that an infant is “closed in on itself.” The spontaneous disturbances in a 
child’s experience are disclosive modes of Befindlichkeit. The child is not an enclosed 
subject, but is ekstatically “outside among” its world (p. 125). The child’s modes 
of turning-toward and turning-away, of approach and resistance in its world, are an 
early version of Dasein’s being-in-the-world, charged with limit experiences such 
as fright, shock, and disturbance. The child, then, exists in a twilight condition of 
ekstatic finitude.
9Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klosterman, 1975ff.), Vol. 27, hereafter GA 27.
10As Boelen says, maturity is a continuing dialogue with early development, rather than a “perfection” 
that leaves behind early stages (Boelen, Personal Maturity, p. ix).
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Now let us turn to some topics that can help articulate how childhood is consti-
tuted by modes of finite being-in-the-world, beginning with the issue of language, 
which is crucial to Heidegger’s phenomenology. Rather than engage in a mere formal 
analysis of language, Heidegger explores the existential setting of speech-practices, 
exchanges of speech in Dasein’s inhabited world. In stressing language as a social 
practice, we come to findings very different from the philosophical tradition’s em-
phasis on ideas in the mind externalized by linguistic signs. Language is essentially 
a public, communicative engagement, a shared articulation of Dasein’s dwelling in 
the world. Language should be understood more as something situated in the world, 
rather than as something originating in conscious thought and then launched out 
to others in the outside world. Indeed, like other modes of existence, language is 
ekstatically “there” in Dasein’s world (BT, p. 205). In addition to communicative 
practice, an analysis of language should include sounds, movements, intonations, 
rhythms, nonverbal gestures, silences, hearing, listening, and responding (BT, 
p. 206). All this is much more complex than a science of linguistics that examines 
words as vorhanden entities and explores their verbal meanings, references, rela-
tions, structures, usages, and so on (BT, p. 209). Indeed, when considered from the 
standpoint of immediate practice, language and even signification are zuhanden 
phenomena (BT, pp. 95–107, 114, 204).
Heidegger came to correlate the emergence of being with the world-disclosive 
function of language. For Heidegger, language cannot be understood simply as a 
function of object designation or as representations of things in the world, because 
such models bank on modes of disclosure already presented in language. To think 
that the world is a set of pre-linguistic things that are designated by words is to 
overlook the fact that “thing” is a word (as are “world,” “is,” “a,” and so on). This 
is why Heidegger correlates language and being, since any disclosure will unfold 
by way of already inherited linguistic meanings and uses. Consequently, Heidegger 
calls language “saying as showing,”11 as the very manifesting of the world’s mean-
ing, and thus of being. Language is the “house of being” in which humans dwell.12 
Even with supposed non-verbal experiences, if these are meaningful experiences 
(and expressible as such), they presuppose a host of orientations and understandings 
that trace back all the way to childhood and enculteration into language.13
It is no wonder that a child’s first words are such a momentous event. Is this not 
the threshold of the child’s emergence out of its twilight state? When a child learns 
to speak, the world begins to open up, and the child begins to develop in ways that 
far exceed prelinguistic conditions. It is interesting to note that the word “infant” 
comes from a Latin term meaning “incapable of speech.” Such incapacity, of course, 
is not a sheer absence but an anticipation; and naming infancy as speech-less shows 
how central linguistic capacity is to human existence.
11Heidegger, On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz and Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper 
and Row, 1971), p. 123.
12Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, 2nd Edition, ed. David F. Krell (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1977), p. 217.
13For Heidegger’s remarks on how experience carries linguistic articulation with it, see BT, p. 190 and 
HCT, p. 56.
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The setting of child-rearing shows that language should not be understood simply 
as the employment of words, but as a symbiotic development of the child’s capacities 
for understanding and behavior in the midst of a prompting linguistic environment. 
In fact, it is clear that language is a multi-faceted environmental influence on children 
from their first moments of life. If language were simply the speaking of words, 
then all the verbal behaviors that we naturally engage in with infants before they 
learn to speak would seem to be a wasted activity. But research has shown that our 
instincts here are appropriate and crucial for the child’s full development later on 
(even for brain development). This suggests that infants are exposed to a preverbal 
“rehearsal” of a complex linguistic environing-world from the very start: in terms of 
facial expressions, touch, physical interactions, gestures, sounds, rhythms, intona-
tions, emotional cues, and a host of behavioral contexts.14 It should also be noted that 
a melodic, lilting, high-pitched pattern of speech directed toward infants (sometimes 
called “motherese”) seems instinctive and universal across cultures; and that such 
tonal patterns seem to communicate basic meanings such as praise or danger, again 
found across cultures. It may be that the musicality of speech—which, of course, 
marks the common cultural forms of poetry and song—is not a mere ornament, but 
rather a function of a primal sensuous register of language beginning at the earliest 
stages of communication and expression.15
In more advanced stages before the advent of speech, parents are constantly 
engaging the child’s activities by way of the above complex together with now 
more focused and deliberate verbal associations, especially in terms of purposive 
behavior. Research in developmental psychology demonstrates that language ac-
quisition, including preverbal rehearsals, is essentially an inter-subjective process 
that precedes and makes possible later developments of focused individuation out 
of an original social nexus (again, Mitsein all the way down).16 For one thing, we 
can note that the phenomenon of pointing, a precursor to language development, 
seems unique to humans (the original Da?), and it also exhibits an inter-subjective 
structure because when infants point, they look back at adults to see if they notice 
it too (a ubiquitous feature of child behavior called “social referencing”).17 Pointing 
exhibits a triangular structure of pointing to something in the world for someone 
else’s attention.
In addition, even the development of self-consciousness can be shown to emerge 
out of the social field of language practice. In developmental psychology, the notion 
14See “New Insights Into How Babies Learn,” Science (August 1997), p. 641, for how early “baby talk” 
to neonates and various interactive behaviors actually contribute to brain development. See also Jerome 
Bruner, Child’s Talk (New York: Norton, 1983).
15For a discussion of the full range of infant-directed speech, see Melanie Soderstrom, “Beyond Babytalk: 
Re-evaluating the Nature and Content of Speech Input to Preverbal Infants,” Developmental Review 27 no. 
4 (2007): 501–32.
16See Chris Moore and Philip Dunham, eds., Joint Attention: Its Origins and Role in Development (New 
York: Psychology Press, 1995), and Alison Gopnik, Andrew N. Metzoff, and Patricia K. Juhl, eds., The 
Scientist in the Crib: Minds, Brains, and How Children Learn (New York: Harper, 2000).
17See Daniel N. Stern, The Interpersonal World of the Infant: A View From Psychoanalysis and Develop-
mental Psychology (New York: Basic Books, 1985) and Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1990).
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of “inner speech” or “private speech”—meaning self-directed verbalization— 
accounts for how language is implicated in self-consciousness. Research shows 
that inner speech is the most important factor in the development of self-awareness, 
the capacity to become the object of one’s own attention, one’s own thoughts and 
behaviors.18 Such a process occurs originally in children but in adults as well 
(p. 2). Fully immersed experience is not self-conscious. A kind of “distance” 
between the observer and the observed is required for the self-awareness of obser-
vation. Inner speech provides this kind of distance (p. 7). It is important to stress 
that such a development is derived from the original social milieu of language, so 
that self-awareness arises from the reproduction of social mechanisms by way of 
self-directed language (p. 5). The case of Helen Keller is instructive because she 
claimed that consciousness first existed for her only after she gained access to lan-
guage (p. 9).19 There is also neurophysiological evidence mapping the processes 
here described (pp. 8ff.).
Private speech in young children (talking to oneself in task performance) has 
often been met with concern by parents; and Piaget had taken it to be a stage of ego-
centrism. But L. S. Vygotsky initiated the dismissal of this scheme by arguing that 
private speech is essential for the cognitive and behavioral development of the child, 
because here the child takes over the regulative role of the social world.20 Language 
begins as collaborative tasking and conversation; private speech is a redirection of 
this milieu toward independent functioning. Cognitive and behavioral capacities 
begin in a social-linguistic network, and private speech begins a process that over 
time leads to the internalization of these capacities that now can operate “silently,” 
as it were.21 In sum, mature development, individuation, and self-consciousness 
are the result of an internalization of the social-linguistic environment, mediated 
by inner or private speech.
In addition to the child’s with-world, the practical environing-world (Umwelt) is 
also relevant to this discussion, in terms of the child’s zuhanden relations in its practi-
cal, behavioral milieu: the cultivation of various skills, habits, and performances in a 
host of making, doing, and playing scenarios. The Heideggerian idea of pre-reflective 
practice seems to be the full measure of childhood activity, the meaning of which 
can best be articulated by Zuhandenheit, rather than the questionable attribution of 
“concepts” or “theories” to a child’s mind. We can also consider how correlations of 
the child’s behavior and the environment exhibit the well-known dyad of nature and 
nurture with respect to human development. The relation between a child’s nature 
and its environment seems to be a fluid, reciprocal, intersectional correlation that 
reflects well the kind of dynamic, holistic structure of being-in-the-world.
18Alain Morin, “Possible Links between Self-awareness and Inner Speech,” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 12 nos. 4–5 (2005): 115–34. Pages numbers given in the text above are from this article.
19Keller also tells of how the meaning of things was hidden from her until she was finally able to access 
language and communication through the sense of touch. See The Story of My Life (New York: Bantam, 
1990), chaps. 5–7.
20Adam Winsler, et. al., “The Role of Private Speech in the Transition From Collaborative to Indepen-
dent Task Performance in Young Children,” Early Childhood Research Quarterly 12 (1997): 57–79. This 
particular point is on page 60.
21Ibid., pp. 61,77.
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In this regard, the nature-nurture binary does not hold up under scrutiny. The 
consensus among most investigators into this question is that a child’s nature is 
neither strictly biologically determined nor wholly malleable by the environment.22 
The “second nature” of developed habits and skills represents a confluence of 
nature and culture that cannot be reduced to either brute facts or arbitrary super-
impositions.23 The intersection of nature and nurture is not even clearly delineable 
into two discrete cooperating factors. Even the womb is a contributing environ-
ment for the biological development of the fetus, and an infant’s behavior will 
influence how caregivers in the social environment will respond to the child (and 
vice versa).24 We have mentioned how language requires both an intrinsic capac-
ity and a prompting environment for it to develop in a child. Then language itself 
becomes a crucial environment influencing human development (simply saying 
something cruel or kind can have at least as much impact on a child as a physical 
event). With Heidegger we can see this linguistic environment as intrinsically 
open, since language is able to give presence to the absences of past and future, 
and accordingly extend immeasurably the possibilities of, and influences on, 
human experience, thought, and action. In sum, from a Heideggerian perspective, 
what is natural to the human condition can be understood as anything but fixed 
and invariable.
The important role of imitation in various linguistic, social, and behavioral de-
velopments in a child’s life can be taken as a perfect illustration of Heideggerian 
ekstatics. Mimetic development shows that what is ekstatically there in the child’s 
environment precedes a fully formed self that is “inside” so to speak. Children may 
need to be shown what to imitate, but not how to imitate.25 An intrinsic mimetic 
capacity in children suggests that the direction toward self-formation is first cued 
by ekstatic absorption in environmental prompts. Evidence for the ekstatic nature 
of imitation can be found in the phenomenon of “invisible imitation,” where infants 
will operate imitatively with parts of the body such as the face that are not visible 
to the infant. Piaget had suggested that such a capacity requires the development 
of a “body schema” around the age of 8–12 months. But there is evidence of this 
mimetic capacity right after birth, for instance, with tongue protrusion. This early 
capacity suggests an immediate outward immersion that need not require some 
inner formed sense directed outward.26
22See Michael Rutter, Genes and Behavior: Nature-Nurture Interplay Explained (Malden MA: Black-
well, 2006).
23For important discussions of second nature in response to various conundrums of modern philosophy, 
see John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
24See Elliot Turiel, Melanie Killen, and Charles C. Helwig, “Morality: Its Structure, Function, and Vaga-
ries,” in The Emergence of Morality in Young Children, ed. Jerome Kagan and Sharon Lamb (Chicago IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987), Ch.4.
25According to Aristotle, imitation (mimēsis) is a natural capacity from childhood, and human beings 
have an advantage over the lower animals because we are the most imitative and learn first by means of 
imitation (Poetics 1448b5ff.).
26See Andrew Meltzoff and M.Keith Moore, “Imitation of Facial and Manual Gestures by Human Neo-
nates,” Science 198 (1977): 75–78, and “Newborn Infants Imitate Adult Facial Gestures,” Child Development 
54 (1983): 702–09.
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What is particularly interesting in child development is the role of motor mimicry, 
which is essential to an extensive range of learning experiences. Motor mimicry is 
a mode of transpositional embodiment, in which, for example, we spontaneously 
wince at other people’s pain, smile at their delight, recoil at their peril, ape their 
movements, and so forth. Such behavior has been generally perceived as a puzzle 
by psychologists.27 Why is it done, especially when we ourselves are not under-
going the movements? It seems, though, that the role of motor mimicry in early 
childhood provides answers, and a Heideggerian ekstatics greatly contributes to an 
understanding of such behaviors. Mimetic response, especially in a child’s early 
face-to-face engagements, would seem to be a fundamentally ekstatic phenomenon. 
In spontaneous mimicry we can presume, as we have suggested, that the “outside” 
comes first in a way and is productive of the child’s “internal” states. Indeed, psy-
chologists speculate that an infant comes to learn about the self primarily through 
the emotional responses of others, a process that then can be looped back to allow 
vicarious learning about the experiences of others.28
Returning to the question of language, with the host of preverbal linguistic re-
hearsals in play right after birth and throughout early stages of development, an 
important insight emerges: What happens before a child learns to speak shows that 
language is a complex constellation of practices and is from the beginning an active, 
performative, affective, embodied, purposeful environing-world that is (in Heideg-
gerian terms) there shaping the child’s sense of things. The general configurations 
of this zuhanden life-world are further articulated when the child learns to speak 
and develops linguistic competence in transactions with the social environment.29 It 
seems to me that Heidegger’s views on language and his phenomenology of being-
in-the-world are given an enhanced strength and concreteness when this crucial 
developmental milieu is brought into view.
In particular, I want to suggest that a Heideggerian correlation of language and 
being can be given some specificity in the context of my discussion. First, language 
acquisition can be understood as the dawning of being in a child’s world. Second, 
language can be characterized as what I call differential fitness, in a manner that 
illuminates two elements of the finitude of being essential to Heidegger’s phenom-
enology: (1) that presence is always animated by traces of absence; and (2) that 
human existence is a thrown involvement in a meaning-saturated world, rather than 
a subject-based autonomy or disengaged cognition.
Language as differential fitness is understood in the following way: (1) Immedi-
ate conversational speech in face-to-face circumstances is directly disclosive for 
participants (“That’s the right wrench; you can use it to tighten these bolts clock-
wise.”). The same is true for indirect speech and written communications (“She told 
me she forgives you.” “I am pleased to report that your article has been accepted 
27Nancy Eisenberg and Janet Strayer, eds., Empathy and Its Development (Cambridge UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), pp. 322–23.
28Ibid., p. 136.
29For a discussion of how pointing, imitation, and infant-directed speech contribute to the full range of 
development in the child, see Robert Storey, Mimesis and the Human Animal (Evanston IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1996), pp. 75ff.
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for publication.”—rare the radical skeptic in this situation!). With such practices, 
language is experienced as immediately fitting, as presumed to be appropriately 
disclosive and functionally suited to experience. Language fits the world more in the 
manner of hand and glove than in “correspondence” relations based on stipulated 
divisions between internal subjective utterances and external objective conditions. 
(2) At the same time, the sheer difference between words as phonic talk and the 
worldly references of such talk produces momentous transformations of experience 
and understanding, both synchronically and diachronically. Besides the array of 
differential relations within language,30 I want to highlight the difference between 
worldly entities and wordly entities, the latter being distinct phonic phenomena 
with the crucial features of retentionality and portability. Beyond the immediate 
disclosive power of words (their fitness), their repeatable retention in speech with-
out their references permits giving presence to the absences of past and future, thus 
opening up a far richer articulation of temporal experience beyond common animal 
capacities of memory and anticipation.
Two remarks are in order here with respect to Heidegger’s thought. First, the 
differential character of language here described and the temporality of being fit 
hand in glove. Second, Heidegger’s approach to truth can be specified in this con-
text. In normal circumstances of speech acts in face-to-face modes, truth is usually 
tacit in its disclosive function (“Look over there, the cat is on the mat.”), a fitness 
that is amenable to what Heidegger calls unconcealment.31 The “problem” of truth 
motivating the correspondence theory stems from possible misfits between present 
utterances and the absences of past and future states (“The cat gets on the mat every 
day after eating.”). Yet the fitness character of language would have to be primal in 
a sense, otherwise language could never get off the ground or function effectively 
in the rearing of children.
Differential fitness helps account for various elements of language acquisition in 
a complex environment of reciprocal behaviors between a child’s natural capacities 
and nurturing social reinforcements. The fitness feature is paramount since initial 
occasions of language learning are reciprocal transactions in the immediate face-
to-face present. Yet differential features function in this milieu as well, especially 
in variants of affirmation and negation (Yes and No) regarding success and failure 
or good and bad behavior. And children must adjust to the initially frustrating tem-
poral structures confronting their experience (“You can’t have a cookie now; wait 
until after supper.”). In general, children learn to incorporate the ineluctable blend 
of positive and negative forces in the meaning structures of their world.
To conclude, I want to extend this discussion of meaning and negation to the 
question of anxiety. The Heideggerian finding that the negative recession of mean-
ing in anxiety animates the disclosure of being receives strong reinforcement in 
30Internal differentiation includes phonic differences that play out in pronunciation, conceptual differ-
ences that correlate meanings (e.g., up and down), and functional differences that orchestrate usage. This 
makes language systematically dynamic and unsettled. The differential character of language animates the 
work of Derrida, which was inspired by Saussure. See Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(Baltimore MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), especially pp. 27–73.
31Consider Heidegger’s example of the skewed picture on the wall (BT, pp. 260ff.)
390 LAWRENCE J. HATAB
considering child development, especially with regard to the universal experience 
of separation anxiety.32 Human attachments and negative experiences of separation 
from attachments occur throughout human life in various forms and contexts: for 
example, losses of, or threats to, possessions, things, people, habits, beliefs, pos-
sibilities, environments, or roles; and encounters with something different, novel, 
strange, or unfamiliar. Despite the difficulties and traumas accompanying such 
experiences, human growth and development are impossible without separating 
from certain attachments and confronting new situations; so facing anxieties is 
essential to human development.33 Particularly important is the role of separation 
anxiety in early child development, and I note that in GA 27, Heidegger refers to 
Angst in his discussion of childhood disturbance (p. 125). Acute separation anxiety 
usually occurs around 8–10 months of age, typically in the context of care-giver 
separation and object loss. Separation anxiety alters an earlier, more undifferen-
tiated relation to care-givers and things. For this reason, separation experiences 
are correlated with the course of individuation.34 In true Heideggerian fashion, 
then, it can be said that separation anxiety is a double movement; it is not a fully 
negative phenomenon because its affective force helps sharpen a child’s experi-
ence of itself and things in the world, thus enriching experience and fostering 
development.35 In anxious separation, a bipolar concentration gathers the urgent 
meaning of the absent person or entity together with the needs and interests of the 
self that is deprived by the absence. Again consistent with Heidegger, it appears 
that the process of early separation and individuation is less a cognitive-perceptual 
phenomenon, and more an emotional-motivational-developmental phenomenon.36 
Additionally, around the third year, mostly facilitated by language development, 
the child develops a sense of object constancy, that absent things can still exist, 
and in such a context, memory and anticipation help mollify anxiety and promote 
a toleration of separation.37
In Heidegger’s phenomenology, the relationship between anxiety and care is a 
reciprocal double-movement. The finitude of being is understood in terms of the 
disclosive significance of unheimlich experiences. Yet Heidegger insists that the 
unheimlich involves an intrinsic correlation with gatherings of meaning, a cor-
relation that avoids extremes in either direction, whether a fixation on beings or a 
romanticized celebration of nomadic abandon. A life without estrangements and 
losses would be a life without meaning and growth. Yet too much estrangement can 
lead to disintegration, trauma, incapacitation, or perhaps excessive attachments as a 
refuge from finitude. The plausibility of this kind of balancing movement is borne 
out by developmental psychology.38 In early life, experiences of loss and responses 
32Much of what follows is taken from Jonathan Bloom-Feshbach and Sally Bloom-Feshbach, eds., The 
Psychology of Separation and Loss (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1987). 
33Ibid., pp. 2–3.
34Ibid., pp. 8ff.
35Ibid., p. 97. See Boelen, Personal Maturity, pp. 27ff.
36The Psychology of Separation and Loss, p. 22. 
37Ibid., p. 17.
38See ibid., pp. 42ff.
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to separation are an index to a child’s development and adjustments in later life. 
Too much care or too little care are both detrimental.
One final remark. The universal phenomenon of separation anxiety and its role in 
child development may provide some support for what I always thought was a rather 
tenuous or groping claim in Heidegger’s unheimlich maneuver: namely, that anxiety 
is “more primordial” than world-familiarity, indeed that the latter is a “mode” of 
the former, and that “anxiety is always latent in being-in-the-world” (BT, p. 234). 
If separation anxiety operates at the very dawning of selfhood, Heidegger’s claim 
seems much less of a stretch.
It is obvious that I have provided only the barest sketch of the topics at hand in 
this essay, and there are numerous other topics to explore. I am convinced that this 
is an important, unexamined area of research. A Heideggerian exploration of child 
development will both enrich this crucial field of study and add further concretion 
and scope to Heidegger’s phenomenology of finite being-in-the-world.
